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Spousal Sexual Assault: Pennsylvania's
Place on the Sliding Scale of Protection
from Marital Rape
When you have been intimately violated by a person who is sup-
posed to love and protect you, it can destroy your capacity for
intimacy with anyone else. Moreover, many wife victims are
trapped in a reign of terror and experience repeated sexual as-
saults over a period of years. When you are raped by a stranger,
you have to live with a frightening memory. When you are
raped by your husband, you have to live with the rapist.'
I. Introduction
Rape is not simply a sexual act to which one party does not
consent. Rather, it is a degrading, violent act which violates the bod-
ily integrity of the victim and frequently causes severe, long-lasting
physical and psychic harm.' Throughout the United States crimes
codes classify and define crimes by the type of act perpetrated, the
state of mind of the actor, and the severity of the injury involved.8 In
contrast, states historically define the crime of rape by the relation-
ship between the parties." The common law definition of rape re-
lieves spouses entirely from criminal liability for the rape of their
spouses.' In recent years, many states have removed the marital ex-
emption from their rape statutes either by legislative enactment or
judicial decision. The new laws vary from complete abolition of the
immunity to partial abolition, depending on the relationship of the
1. Schulman & Rickenberg, Florida, New York, and Virginia Courts Declare Mari-
tal Rape a Crime, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. No. 7, 745 (November 1984) (testimony and
statement in support of H.B. 516 to remove spousal exemption to sexual assault offenses, by
Dr. David Finkelhor to the Judiciary Committee, New Hampshire State Legislature, March
25, 1981).
2. People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152. -, 474 N.E.2d 567, 573, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207,
213 (1984).
3. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 7 (1972).
4. At common law rape was defined as unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman, not a
spouse, forcibly and against her will. Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 345 Pa. Super. 269, 274,
498 A.2d 395, 397 (1985).
5. Spousal immunity does not exist when the husband aids or abets another person in
the rape of his wife. See generally Annot., 24 A.L.R. 4th 105 (1983).
parties when the attack occurs. The Pennsylvania Legislature cre-
ated the crime of spousal sexual assault7 in December, 1984 to elimi-
nate criminal immunity created by the perpetrator's marital status.
Although Pennsylvania's legislation was intended as a step in the di-
rection toward providing a legal remedy for victims of marital rape,,
the current law merely perpetuates the unequal protection histori-
cally presented to sexually abused spouses.
This comment suggests consideration and rectification of the un-
equal, and therefore, inadequate protection given to Pennsylvania
victims of marital rape. A discussion of the need for reform of the
marital rape laws, the rationales underlying the spousal exemption,
and action taken by other states' lawmakers will provide insight into
the action of the Pennsylvania Legislature. A discussion of the Penn-
sylvania response is followed by criticisms of the spousal sexual as-
sault law by both its opponents and its supporters. Finally, this com-
ment suggests complete abolition of spousal immunity and equal
application of the rape9 and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse 0
laws of Pennsylvania to all persons, regardless of their marital status,
as a viable solution to cure the inadequacies of the current spousal
sexual assault law.
H. Call for Reform
A. Quantitative Analysis of Marital Rape
Marital rape is a documented and serious problem that deserves
national attention and legal recognition. The stereotype that a rapist
6. For a complete description of the status of the marital exemption in other states'
legislation, see infra text accompanying notes 89-117, 120-29, 132-42.
7. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3128 (Purdon Supp. 1985) provides:
§ 3128. Spousal sexual assault
(a) Sexual Assault.-A person commits a felony of the second degree when
that person engages in sexual intercourse with that person's spouse:
(1) by forcible compulsion;
(2) by threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by
a person of reasonable resolution; or
(3) who is unconscious.
(b) Involuntary spousal deviate sexual intercourse.-A person commits a
felony of the second degree when that person engages in deviate sexual inter-
course with that person's spouse:
(1) by forcible compulsion;
(2) by threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by
a person of reasonable resolution; or
(3) who is unconscious.
(c) Crime to be reported.-The crime of spousal sexual assault shall be
personally reported by the victim or her agent to a law enforcement agency hav-
ing the requisite jurisdiction within 90 days of the commission of the offense.
8. The term "marital rape" includes acts of both sexual intercourse and involuntary
deviate sexual intercourse.
9. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (Purdon 1983).
10. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3123 (Purdon 1983).
is a sex crazed stranger waiting in bushes or dark alleys to ambush
his victim is a myth. Recent studies estimate that from thirty-two
percent to fifty-nine percent of all rapes or attempted rapes involve
an assailant known to the victim.1" Specific statistics regarding the
prevalence of spousal sexual abuse demonstrate that from ten per-
cent to fourteen percent of all married women are victims of marital
rape.1" To the extent that these figures can be generalized regarding
the population at large, it is estimated that at least one out of every
seven women who have ever been married has been raped by her
husband at least once and sometimes many times over a period of
years.' a Authorities often question these figures as representatively
low because victims are less likely to report a rape, either to the
authorities or to a survey interviewer, when they know the
assailant.' 4
B. Qualitative Analysis of Marital Rape
Many people disregard marital rape as a reality because they
envision a wife saying "not tonight, honey" and a husband merely
overcoming her reluctance through nonviolent means. This simply is
not the scenario described by the term marital rape. Rapes in mari-
tal relationships are often accompanied by severe violence.' 5
A commentator who has studied spousal sexual abuse in depth
suggests that cases of forced sex within a marital relationship fall
11. Amir's research (1971) on patterns of victimization revealed that 48% of the rape
victims knew the offender. Pauline Bart's survey found that less than half of the victims were
raped by total strangers. R. GELLES, FAMILY VIOLENCE 125 (179); using data compiled from a
ten year period (1973-82) of the National Crime Survey, it was noted that 32% of all rapes or
attempted rapes were committed by a nonstranger to the victim. Bureau of Justice Statistics,
U.S. Dept. of Justice, The Crime of Rape, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, NCJ-
9677, 4-5 (March 1985) [hereinafter cited as Crime Statistics].
12. Studies and surveys report that from 10% to 14% of all married women are victims
of marital rape and from 36% to 37% of battered women have been marital rape victims. See
Finkelhor & Yllo, Rape in Marriage: A Sociological View, THE DARK SIDE OF FAMILIES:
CURRENT FAMILY VIOLENCE RESEARCH 119-20 (1983); 14% of 930 women interviewed in San
Francisco who had ever been married had been raped by a ,husband or ex-husband. The fact
that the women were located by random sample is important because it allows generalizations
to be made about the population at large. D. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE 2 (1982).
13. D. RUSSELL, supra note 12, at 2. (Ms. Russell only included sexual encounters that
met California's legal definition of rape, that is: forced intercourse, or intercourse obtained by
physical threats or intercourse completed when the woman was drugged, asleep, unconscious or
otherwise totally helpless and therefore unable to consent.)
14. Crime Statistics, supra note II, at 2-3. Reinforcing the theory that the statistics
for the prevalence of marital rape are lower than the actual occurrence of the crime is the fact
that the most common reasons for not reporting a rape are that it is too private or personal
and that nothing could be done. Id. at 4-5; this rationale is particularly pertinent to a marital
relationship. In Ms. Russell's study, only 6 of the 87 victims of wife rape (7%) mentioned their
experience in answering the only direct question on rape. All of the victims, however, felt they
had been sexually abused. D. RUSSELL, supra note 12, at 52-53.
15. D. RUSSELL, supra note 12, at 359. In 37% of the marital rape cases studied, wife
rape and wife beating were both present. Id. at 90.
into three categories: battering rapes, non-battering rapes, and obses-
sive rapes. Battering rapes occur in relationships where there is al-
ready a large amount of physical abuse. Non-battering rapes often
occur as a result of a specific sexual conflict such as how often to
have sex and what are appropriate sexual activities. Obsessive rapes,
the least common type, arise out of a spouse's unusual sexual preoc-
cupation such as the need for pornography or violence to create sex-
ual stimulation."
In addition, the injury a rape victim suffers goes beyond mere
physical pain.17 Marital rape is the most traumatic form of rape.
Victims of spousal sexual abuse suffer greater and longer term
trauma than other rape victims.' 8 Psychological injuries suffered by
marital rape victims include betrayal, entrapment within the mar-
riage, isolation, disillusionment and contamination of the entire mar-
riage."9 Many of these injuries do not occur in a rape performed by a
stranger. Rape is the intimate violation of a person's trust and auton-
omy. Prior intimate contact with the rapist does not decrease the
rape's impact but makes that violation much more extreme.20
III. Judicial Recognition of the Need for Reform
A. Historical Justifications for Spousal Immunity
An examination of the origins of the marital rape exemption is
necessary to understand its inapplicability in today's society.2
Courts historically advance three theories supporting the exemption's
existence: The contract-implied consent theory, the woman as prop-
erty theory, and the marital unity theory.2 An understanding of
these concepts will aid the reader in identifying the need for reform
16. Address by Dr. David Finkelhor, Marital Rape: The Misunderstood Crime, New
York County Lawyers Association (May 3, 1984) (on file at the DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Office) [hereinafter cited as The Misunderstood Crime]. Dr. Finkelhor is a professor of sociol-
ogy and director of the family violence research project at the University of New Hampshire.
This data is derived from a survey of 521 women in Boston.
17. "[T]he essence of the crime [of rape] is not the fact of intercourse but the injury
and outrage to the modesty and feelings of the woman, by means of the carnal knowledge
effected by force." State v. Castner, 122 Me. 106, -, 119 A. 112 (1921).
18. The Misunderstood Crime, supra note 16, at 3; D. RUSSELL, supra note 12, at 359.
19. See The Misunderstood Crime, supra note 16, at 3-4; D. RUSSELL, supra note 12,
at 192-93.
20. The Misunderstood Crime, supra note 16, at 3.
21. This section is intended to give the reader a basic understanding of the rationales
underlying the marital exemption. The theories advanced are specifically refuted by case law
in the section that follows.
22. For excellent and in-depth discussions of these theories, see People v. Liberta, 64
N.Y.2d 152, 474 N.E.2d 567, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1984); State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. 219,
372 A.2d 386 (Law Div. 1977), affd per curiam, 169 N.J. Super. 98, 404 A.2d 331 (App.
Div. 1979), rev'd, 85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d 38 (1981); Schwartz, The Spousal Rape Exemption
for Criminal Rape Prosecution, 7 VT. L. REV. 33 (1982); Comment, The Marital Rape Ex-
emption, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 306 (1977).
of the marital exemption due to the changing status of women in
today's society.
1. The Contract-Implied Consent Theory.-The most com-
monly cited rationale underlying the marital exemption is derived
from an 1847 treatise on English law written by Lord Matthew
Hale. In discussing the crime of rape and possible defenses, Hale
stated, "[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by
himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial con-
sent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her
husband, which she cannot retract."23 Under Hale's contract ap-
proach, a wife gives carte blanche consent to sexual intercourse at
the time of the marriage. Therefore, consent to each occasion of sex-
ual intercourse is unnecessary. Consequently, a husband cannot be
prosecuted for committing a rape upon his wife because consent is
always present. 4
2. Woman as Property Theory.-Rape laws developed at a
time when a woman was considered the property of either her father
or her husband.2 5 The laws were originally designed to secure a wo-
man's value as a sexual object. Therefore, the purpose of the law was
to protect male property interests. From this point of view, a hus-
band could not rape his wife because he was simply making use of
his own property.2
3. Marital Unity Theory.-Another rationale for the marital
exemption developed from the theory that the legal identity of a wife
merged into that of her husband. As described by Blackstone in
1765: "By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law:
that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended
during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into
that of her husband under whose wing, protection and cover, she per-
forms everything . . . .", The "unity of person" principle made
rape by a husband a legal impossibility since a man cannot rape
himself.2 8
23. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 628, 629 (1847).
24. See, e.g., People v. Damen, 28 I11. 2d 464, 466, 193 N.E.2d 25, 27 (1963); People
v. Pizzura, 211 Mich. 71, 73, 178 N.W. 235, 236 (1920); Frazier v. State, 48 Tex. Crim. 142,
86 S.W. 754 (1905); Commonwealth v. Fogerty, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 389 (1857).
25. "A close examination of the historical origins of [the husband's immunity] reveals
that it was rooted in the ancient concepts of a wife as chattel and the inviolability of the
husband's role in the marriage." State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. 219, 229, 372 A.2d 386, 391
(Law Div. 1977), affd per curiam, 169 N.J. Super. 98, 404 A.2d 331 (App. Div. 1979), rev'd,
85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d 38 (1981).
26. Comment, supra note 22, at 309.
27. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 430 (1765).
28. Comment, supra note 22. at 310.
B. Judicial Contravention of the Marital Rape Exemption
Although still a minority, courts of six states have held that the
marital exemption is not viable in their states. These courts have
uniformly held that the three theories underlying the marital exemp-
tion - contract-implied consent, women as property, and marital
unity - are inapplicable in modern society.
1. Implied Spousal Immunity: Statutory Interpretation.-In
1981, the courts of New Jersey,29 Massachusetts, 0 and Florida 1
held that a common law marital rape exemption was not implicit in
their otherwise silent rape statutes.32 The facts of these cases were
very similar because the parties were not living together at the time
of the attack.3
In State v. Smith, the Supreme Court of New Jersey considered
the state's appeal of the defendant-husband's successful motion to
dismiss charges of rape of his wife on the ground that the criminal
rape statute codified the alleged common law marital exemption.
The court first examined the history of Hale's Doctrine, 4 heavily
relied upon throughout the years to justify the marital exemption,
and concluded that its precedential value was very limited.3" The
court then addressed the validity of the three justifications for the
common law marital exemption. The court opined that the woman as
property theory 86 was not viable because the idea that a woman was
the property of her husband or father was never valid in this coun-
29. State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. 219, 372 A.2d 386 (Law Div. 1977), affd per
curiam, 169 N.J. Super. 98, 404 A.2d 331 (App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d 38
(1981); companion case, State v. Morrison, 85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d 47 (1981).
30. Commonwealth v. Chretien, 383 Mass. 123, 417 N.E.2d 1203 (1981).
31. State v. Smith, 401 So.2d 1126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
32. N.J. STAT. ANN. § A:138-1 (West 1969) (repealed); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
265, § 22, ch. 277, § 39 (West amended 1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 794.11, 794.011(5) (West
1979).
33. In State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. 219, 372 A.2d 386 (Law Div. 1977), af'd per
curiam, 169 N.J. Super. 98, 404 A.2d 331 (App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d 38
(1981), the victim and the defendant were legally married but living in different cities. In
Commonwealth v. Chretien, 383 Mass. 123, 417 N.E.2d 1203 (1981), the victim and the de-
fendant were separated pursuant to a preliminary divorce decree. In State v. Smith, 401 So.2d
1126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), the victim and the defendant were living separately; the
victim-wife had filed for divorce and obtained a temporary restraining order enjoining the
parties from molesting, harassing, or interfering with one another.
34. See supra text accompanying note 23.
35.
Hale cited no authority for this proposition and we have found none in earlier
writers. Thus the marital exemption rule expressly adopted by many of our sister
states has its source in a bare, extrajudicial declaration made 300 years ago.
Such a declaration cannot itself be considered a definitive and binding statement
of the common law, although legal commentators have often restated the rule
since the time of Hale without evaluating its merits.
85 N.J. 193, 200, 426 A.2d 38, 41 (1981).
36. See supra text accompanying note 25.
try.37 Rather than protecting property interests, rape statutes in New
Jersey protect the safety and personal liberty of women.38 Examining
the marital unity justification, 9 the court acknowledged an inconsis-
tency in allowing an exemption for rape when a husband could be
convicted for committing other crimes upon his wife such as assault
and battery.40 The court recognized that the "principle" of marital
unity, if it existed at all, was discarded through the enactment of
Married Women's Property Acts in the nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries which gave married women rights to sue and be sued,
to own property, and to enter contracts separately from their
husbands.41
Finally, the court addressed the contract-implied consent ration-
ale,4 2 which affords irrevocable consent through the marriage con-
tract.48 Expressing its disapproval of this justification for spousal im-
munity, the court stated that
• . . this implied consent rationale, besides being offensive to
our valued ideals of personal liberty, is not sound where the
marriage itself is not irrevocable. If a wife can exercise a legal
right to separate from her husband and eventually terminate the
marriage "contract," may she not also revoke a "term" of that
contract, namely consent to intercourse? . . . If the wife's re-
peated refusals are a breach of the marriage "contract," . . .
[the husband's] remedy is in a matrimonial court, not in violent
or forceful self help.44
The court held that New Jersey's no-fault divorce law45 allows either
spouse to make a unilateral decision to end the marriage. Coise-
quently, a wife has a right to refuse sexual intercourse with her hus-
band during a separation.46 Having concluded that the three major
common law justifications for the marital rape exemption were not
viable in New Jersey at the time of the defendant's conduct, the
37. State v. Smith, 85 N.J. 193, 204, 426 A.2d 38, 43-44 (1981).
38. Id. at 204, 426 A.2d at 44.
39. See supra text accompanying note 27.
40. State v. Smith, 85 N.J. 193, 204-05, 426 A.2d 38, 44 (1981).
41. Id. at 205, 426 A.2d at 44. The New Jersey court also cited other changes in New
Jersey common law that would contradict the marital unity rationale underlying the marital
exemption. See generally Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970) (abolition of
spousal tort immunity); King v. Green, 30 N.J. 395, 153 A.2d 49 (1959) (alienability of wife's
interest in property held in tenancy by the entirety); In re Lawrence, 133 N.J. Super. 408, 336
A.2d 80 (App. Div. 1975) (wife not compelled to assume husband's surname); State v. Pitt-
man, 124 N.J. Super. 334, 306 A.2d 500 (Law Div. 1973) (indictment of husband and wife
for conspiracy).
42. See supra text accompanying note 23.
43. State v. Smith, 85 N.J. 193, 205-06, 426 A.2d 38, 44 (1981).
44. Id.
45. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:34-2(d) (West 1971).
46. State v. Smith, 85 N.J. 193, 206-07, 426 A.2d 38, 44 (1981).
court held that it would be irrational to believe a marital exemption
for rape existed.'
7
Both Commonwealth v. Chretien,'8 a Massachusetts case, and
State v. Smith,'49 a Florida case coincidentally bearing the same
name as its New Jersey counterpart, relied heavily on Smith's ra-
tionale in their criticism of the marital rape exemption. In Chretien,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the Massa-
chusetts Legislature's comprehensive revisions of the rape laws in
1974 were intended to criminalize marital rape. Although the court
found no statement of legislative intent or policy regarding the rape
statute itself, it found that the legislature's enactment of the Domes-
tic Violence Act 50 in 1978 expressed the legislature's intent to
criminalize marital rape.5 1
In State v. Smith, a Florida appellate court held that a common
law interspousal exemption was not implicit in Florida's sexual bat-
tery statute. The court referred to the New Jersey Supreme Court's
critical analysis of the archaic notions underlying the exemption in
Smith (N.J.) and stated:
Accepting the principles that our sexual battery statute pros-
cribes a crime of violence and not a crime of sex, it is an indica-
tion that the people of this state no longer will tolerate a violent
assault, sexual or otherwise, upon one another. Clearly, no per-
son in this state can justifiably claim a legal right to impose his
or her sexual will upon another person, including his or her
spouse, over that person's unmistakable objection."'
In 1984, a Florida appeals court expanded the judicial abolition
of the marital rape exemption, in State v. Rider,53 when it held that
criminal liability could be established for sexual battery5' upon an-
other spouse when the spouses were living together as husband and
wife at the time of the rape, and no divorce or separation proceed-
47. Id. at 207, 426 A.2d at 45. "A man separated from his wife - and perhaps one not
separated - could not invoke an outdated and doubtful rule to avoid prosecution for rape
simply because he was still legally married to his victim." Id. at 211, 426 A.2d at 47.
48. 383 Mass. 123, 417 N.E.2d 1203 (1981).
49. 401 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
50. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 209 A, § 3 (West 1978).
51
This [Domestic Violence Act] provides a wide range of remedies for "abuse"
and expressly defines "abuse" to cover involuntary sexual relations engaged in
by spouses when one spouse is made to submit by force, threat of force or duress
.... We think that [the Domestic Violence Act] provides us with a clear legis-
lative statement of public policy which ... reflects the intent of the Legislature
to criminalize such conduct.
303 Mass. 123, -, 417 N.E.2d 1203, 1209 (1981).
52. 401 So.2d 1126, 1129 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
53. 449 So.2d 903 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), appeal dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 1830
(1985).
54. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (3,5) (West 1981).
ings were previously initiated.58 The trial court granted the defend-
ant-husband's motion to dismiss the sexual battery charges and held
that the marital exemption would apply unless the complaining wit-
ness had initiated a judicial proceeding for dissolution of the mar-
riage, had obtained a separation agreement, or physically had sepa-
rated herself from the defendant."'
On appeal, the court refused to draw a distinction between
spouses living together and those living apart. The court stated that
resting a decision on those factors required an assumption that the
common law exemption existed. 7 Noting that the purpose of Flor-
ida's sexual battery statute was to protect an individual's sexual pri-
vacy from violence, the court held that the common law spousal ex-
emption was never adopted in Florida. Even if it had existed at one
time, the court concluded that the repeal of the rape statute and
enactment of the sexual battery statute abolished any common law
assumptions concerning the crime of rape." In refusing to recognize
spousal immunity, the court further noted the dubious validity of the
rationale historically underlying the marital exemption and acknowl-
edged that societal change since the exemption's origination required
its abolition."
In 1984, the Supreme Court of Virginia"0 considered the valid-
ity of the marital rape exemption in Weishaupt v. Commonwealth.
As in Smith (N.J.) and Chretein, the court examined a silent stat-
ute6 l to determine whether it implicitly incorporated the common
law marital exemption. After examining the views of Massachusetts,
New Jersey and Florida, the Virginia court upheld the defendant
husband's conviction, noting the archaic nature of the woman as
property and marital unity justifications for the marital exemption."
Regarding the contract-implied consent theory of irrevocable con-
55. 449 So.2d 903 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), appeal dismissed, 105 S.Ct. 1830
(1985). Defendant was charged with two counts of sexual battery after striking his wife on the
head with a piece of metal, disrobing her, and tying her to the bed with duct tape in a spread
eagle position; see also Warren v. State, 255 Ga. 151, 336 S.E.2d 221 (1985) where the Su-
preme Court of Georgia found criminal liability when the couple was living together at the
time of the attack.
56. 449 So.2d 903, 904 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), appeal dismissed, 105 S.Ct. 1830
(1985).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 906.
59
[A] court must interpret the law in light of changing concepts, rea-
son and good conscience and can no longer interpret the law from the back of
an ass; the process is so slow that it overlooks factors that require a different
interpretation today from what might have been required yesterday.
Id. at 907 (emphasis in original).
60. 227 Va. 389, 315 S.E.2d 847 (1984).
61. VA. CODE § 18.2-61 (1950).
62. 227 Va. 389, 401-02, 315 S.E.2d 847, 853-54 (1984).
sent, the court concluded that Virginia's no-fault divorce statute 3
embodied a legislative endorsement of a woman's unilateral right to
withdraw an implied consent to marital sex."4 The court limited its
decision to the facts of the case, however, and abolished the marital
rape exemption only when the wife unilaterally revokes her implied
consent by manifesting her intent to terminate the marital relation-
ship by living separate and apart from her husband, refraining from
voluntary sexual intercourse with her husband, and conducting her-
self in a manner that establishes a de facto end to the marriage.
65
While providing protection to women who have manifested an intent
to end their marriage, the Virginia Supreme Court expressly recog-
nized a husband's right to forcible rape as superior to a wife's legally
recognized rights of independence, autonomy, and bodily integrity
within the marriage.66
2. Express Spousal Immunity: Equal Protection Chal-
lenges.-Judicial innovation regarding the marital rape exemption
occurred in 1983 when the Suffolk County Court of New York, in
People v. DeStefano,67 invalidated an express partial spousal rape
exemption" as violative of the equal protection clauses of the state
and federal constitutions. 69 Even though DeStefano is a lower court
decision, it is a landmark case because it invalidated an express mar-
ital rape exemption.
The couple, in DeStefano, were living apart at the time of the
attack. The wife obtained a temporary protection order requiring the
defendant to remain away from the marital home at all times and to
refrain from acts or threats of physical violence toward her. The de-
fendant allegedly entered the family residence in violation of this or-
der and raped his wife at knifepoint. Defendant moved to dismiss the
63. VA. CODE § 20-91(a) (1950).
64. 227 Va. 389, 403-04, 315 S.E.2d 847, 854 (1984).
65. Id. at 405, 315 S.E.2d at 855.
66. See also Kizer v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 256, 321 S.E.2d 291 (1984) (the major-
ity interpreted Weishaupt to require that the Commonwealth prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the husband perceived or reasonably should have perceived that the marriage actually was
ended).
67. 121 Misc. 2d 113, 467 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1983).
68. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00(4) (McKinney 1978) contains a partial marital exemp-
tion because under certain circumstances spouses are defined as "not married." The law de-
fined "not married" as spouses
who are living apart pursuant to (i) order issued by a court of competent juris-
diction which by its terms or in its effect requires such living apart, or (ii) decree
of judgment of separation, or (iii) written agreement of separation . . . which
contains provisions specifically indicating that the actor may be guilty of the
commission of a crime for engaging in conduct which constitutes an offense pre-
scribed by this article against and without the consent of the female.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00(4) (McKinney 1978).
69. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
rape indictment challenging the constitutionality of New York's rape
statute. 0 Since the spouses were living apart and a protection order
had been issued, the husband was considered "not married" under
New York's spousal exemption. Defendant claimed that his equal
protection rights were violated because the New York law granted
some but not all husbands the right to nonconsensual intercourse. 1
After examining the traditional justifications for the marital
rape exemption, the contract-implied consent, woman as property,
and marital unity theories, the court concluded that, due to their
questionable validity, these concepts did not constitute a government
interest sufficient to meet the reasonable basis, middle tier or strict
scrutiny tests used in equal protection analysis.72 Specifically re-
jecting the contract-implied consent theory, the court noted the con-
stitutional right of a woman to have an abortion and practice birth
control without her husband's approval.7 8 The court held that a logi-
cal extension of these rights is that a woman has a right to refuse the
physical act that leads to such pregnancy.7' The court recognized the
sanctity of marriage but found that permitting any type of exemp-
tion amounted to the state impermissibly granting a husband the
right to control his wife's bodily integrity.7 Holding that the protec-
tion order was sufficient to apprise the defendant of possible criminal
liability, the court struck down New York's marital rape exemption
as violative of the state and federal constitutions.
Perhaps the most far reaching decision concerning the marital
rape exemption was handed down in 1984 by the Court of Appeals
of New York in People v. Liberta.7 6 In Liberta, the defendant-hus-
band, while living apart from his wife pursuant to a family court
order, forcibly raped and sodomized his wife in front of their two
and one-half year old son. Although New York's statute77 contained
an express marital exemption, the defendant was prosecuted under
an exception to the marital exemption that made it inapplicable to
70. See supra note 68.
71. 121 Misc. 2d 113, 115, 467 N.Y.S.2d 506, 509 (1983).
72. Id. at 127, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
73. Id. at 122, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 513. See also Planned Parenthood of Mo. v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52 (1976); Zagrow v. Zagrow, 105 Misc. 2d 1054, 430 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1980).
74. "It would be futile to rule that a woman must submit to a pregnancy and then hold
that she may legally abort it." (emphasis in original). 121 Misc. 2d 113, 123, 467 N.Y.S.2d
506, 513 (1983).
75.
While recognizing the sanctity of marriage modern decisional law also recog-
nizes that the right of a wife to supremacy over her own body is paramount to
her spouse's desires. Indeed her rights to individual autonomy and to control
procreation are but a part of a more comprehensive right to bodily integrity.
Id. at 123, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 514.
76. 64 N.Y.2d 152, 474 N.E.2d 567, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1984).
77. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.35, 130.50 (McKinney 1978).
spouses living apart pursuant to separation agreements or certain
court orders. 78 The defendant-husband appealed the application of
this exception and, in case he was treated just as any other unmar-
ried male, he challenged the constitutionality of the rape and sodomy
statutes as violative of the equal protection clauses of the state and
federal constitutions.7 ' He alleged that the statute burdened some
but not all males and also burdened only men, not women."
The highest court of New York held that no rational basis ex-
isted for distinguishing between marital rape and nonmarital rape,
stating that " . . . the various rationales which have been asserted in
defense of the exemption are either based upon archaic notions about
consent and property rights incident to a marriage or are simply un-
able to withstand even the slightest scrutiny." 81 The court also found
that modern justifications for the exemption, such as marital privacy
and encouragement of reconciliations, are legitimate state interests,
but found no rational relation between these interests and allowing a
husband forcibly to rape his wife.
82
After considering the gender based equal protection claim, the
New York court held that the statutes for rape and sodomy in the
first degree were unconstitutionally underinclusive. 83 Concluding
that the legislature would prefer to have statutes that cover forcible
rape and sodomy with no exceptions, rather than no statutes pro-
scribing forcible rape and sodomy, the court eliminated the exemp-
tions and preserved the statutes." The court resolved any possible
due process problems in upholding the defendant's conviction by not-
ing that the defendant, who was considered "not married" under the
statutes, had notice that his conduct was criminal under the statutes
at the time of the rape.
85
These recent decisions indicate that some courts have acknowl-
edged that marital rape is a serious problem in our country. The
cases form a substantial body of law that does not mechanically ap-
ply an outdated doctrine but instead recognizes forced marital sex as
rape.
78. See N.Y. PENAL LAW supra note 68 (text of statute).
79. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
80. 64 N.Y.2d 152, 163, 474 N.E.2d 567, 570, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207, 211 (1984).
81. Id. at 163, 474 N.E.2d at 573, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 213.
82. Id. at 164, 474 N.E.2d at 574, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 214.
83. Id. at 170, 474 N.E.2d at 575-78, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 218.
84. "[T]o declare such statutes a nullity would have a disastrous effect on the public
interest and safety." Id. at 171, 474 N.E.2d at 578, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 218.
85. "[T]he defendant is simply not similarly situated to those persons who were not
within the scope of the statutes as they existed prior to our decision." Id. at 173, 474 N.E.2d
at 579, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
IV. Legislative Recognition of the Need for Reform
Legislative response to the problem of marital rape has not been
as progressive as some of the judicial action previously discussed.
While the legislature is the most appropriate body to act, and public
opposition to the reform of rape laws does not appear very strong,86
legislators appear uncomfortable with the topic of marital rape.87
A. Statutory Status of the Marital Exemption Countrywide
As of May, 1985, twenty-nine states expressly prohibited prose-
cution of a husband for the rape of his wife if the couple was living
together at the time of the attack.88 In these states, the victim's legal
protection is contingent upon the parties' relationship at the time of
the attack. Alabama, 89 Illinois,90 and South Dakota91 bar husbands
86. Comment, The Marital Rape Exemption: Legal Sanction of Spouse Abuse, 18 J.
FAm. L. 565, 579 (1979-80).
87. Some legislators' reluctance to deal honestly and seriously with the problem of
marital rape is evidenced by the following communications: "But if you can't rape your wife,
who can you rape?" (California State Senator Bob Wilson, addressing a group of women
lobbyists, Spring 1979) cited in Joanne Schulman, The Marital Rape Exemption in Criminal
Law, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 539 (October 1980); Another example,
Due to a situation in Oregon in which a man is on trial for raping his wife,
the following "Consent Form" is being furnished as a public service for Mon-
tana's males.
It's recommended that no sexual contact be made by Montana's males with
their wives until this form has been filled out and signed.
Remember, tonight she may be willing but tomorrow YOU MAY BE
CHARGED WITH RAPE.
AGREEMENT
I, do hereby on this




pull down my nightgown when you're through)to have sexual relations with
my husband between the hours of - and
(Signed)Public Service Form No. 61600
Legally, this form is but a one-time agreement, of course. Any sexual con-
tact other than on the above date and at the above time shall require a new
agreement.
Additional copies of this form can be obtained from State Senator Pat Re-
gan ....
(Form drawn up and circulated to Senators by a Montana Legislator during a campaign for a
marital rape law) cited in D. RUSSELL, supra note 12, at 23-24; and even in the Pennsylvania
House of Representatives while debating H.B. 400 which was intended to abolish Pennsylva-
nia's spousal exemption, "I have never forced myself on my wife; instead, I paid her each
time." 90 PA. LEG. J. 1802 (daily ed. November 15, 1983) (statement by Rep. Friend).
88. National Center on Women and Family Law, MARITAL RAPE EXEMPTION CHART:
STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS (1985) (this organization provides periodic updates on the status of
marital rape laws throughout the country).
89. ALA. CODE §§ 6-60-(4), 6-61 (1982).
90. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 12-14, 12-18 (1983) (exemption abolished in aggravated
criminal sexual assault if reported within 30 days).
91. S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 22-22-1 (1979).
from rape charges until a final decree of divorce is entered. In Ken-
tucky,92 Louisiana,"8 Maryland,9' Missouri, 96 North Carolina,96
North Dakota,'7 Rhode Island,98 South Carolina" and Utah, 100 the
marital exemption ends when the parties separate under a court or-
der. A two pronged test exists in Indiana,"'0 Michigan, 0 2 Nevada, 03
Ohio' 0' and Tennessee'05 under which the parties must live apart
and one spouse must have filed a petition for annulment, divorce,
separation, or separate maintenance before the rape. Less restric-
tively, Idaho,' 06 New Mexico,107 Oklahoma,' 0 and Texas' 09 require
that the parties live apart or that one spouse has initiated legal pro-
ceedings. Finally, Alaska," 0  Arizona,"' Colorado," 2  Iowa," 8
Maine,"' Mississippi," 5 Montana,"' and Virginia" 7 simply require
that the parties lived apart at the time of the attack for the spousal
immunity to cease.
All of these states seem to require, as did the Virginia Supreme
Court," 8 that the victim-spouse manifest an intent to end the mar-
riage or at least revoke the implied consent allegedly incident to the
92. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010(3) (Baldwin 1975).
93. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:41, 14:43 (West 1978) (amended) (1984 amendment
abolished the exemption in aggravated sexual battery only).
94. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 464D (1982).
95. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.010(2) (Vernon 1979).
96. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.8 (1981) (exemption also ends if the couple is living apart
pursuant to a written separation agreement).
97. N.D. CENr. CODE §§ 12.1-20-01, 12.1-20-03 (1985) (includes orders of protection;
also, marital exemption eliminated in the crime of gross sexual imposition but voluntary social
companion exemption included).
98. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37-1, 11-37-2.1 (amended 1982) (exemption eliminated in
first degree sexual assault if the parties have been living apart for more than 90 days or pursu-
ant to a court order, and the assault is reported to the police within 24 hours).
99. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-658 (Law. Co-op. 1977).
100. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-402, 76-5-407 (1979).
101. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-1(b) (Burns amended 1985) (protective order
included).
102. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 788(1)-(5) (West 1985).
103. NEV. REv. STAT. § 200.373 (1977).
104. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.01(L), 2907.2 (Baldwin 1982) (or if parties have
entered into a written separation agreement).
105. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-610 (1982).
106. IDAHO CODE § 18-6107 (1979) (parties must be living apart at least 180 days).
107. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-9-10E, 30-9-11 (1978).
108. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § IIII(B) (amended by 1983 Okla Sess. Laws Sec. 1,
ch. 41; effective November 1, 1984) (orders or protection included).
109. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(c) (amended Vernon 1983).
110. ALASKA STAT. § 11-41.445(a) (1983) (marriage is an affirmative defense, except
where the parties are living apart or the defendant caused serious physical injury).
111. Aiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1401.4, 13-1404 to 13-1406 (Supp. 1985).
112. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-409 (1979).
113. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 709.2, 709.3, 709.4 (West Supp. 1985).
114. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, §§ 11-251, 11-252 (Supp. 1985).
115. Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-9 (1985) (sexual battery).
116. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502-03 (1983).
117. VA. CODE § 18.2-61 (1982).
118. See Weishaupt v. Virginia, 227 Va. 256, 315 S.E.2d 847 (1984).
marriage. Unfortunately, legislators of these states have not recog-
nized the illogical nature of the contract-implied consent rationale.11 9
Currently, eighteen states have abolished the marital rape ex-
emption and have allowed spouses to charge their spouses with rape
in all or most cases when the couple is living together at the time of
the attack. California, 20 Connecticut,"'1 Delaware, 2' Hawaii,12 3
Minnesota,12 4 New Hampshire,"2 5 Pennsylvania,'
126 Washington,1 27
West Virginia,' 28 and Wyoming1 29 have partially stricken or limited
the exemption so that rape by a cohabiting spouse is a crime under
most circumstances. Finally, in accord with the logic of the Supreme
Court of Florida'3 0 and the New York Court of Appeals,13 1 Flor-
ida, 2 Kansas,138 Massachusetts, 4 Nebraska,135 New Jersey, " 6
New York, 37 Oregon, 8a Vermont, 39 and Wisconsin140 have abol-
ished the marital rape exemption in all cases so that rape by a
spouse is handled in the same manner as rape by a stranger.
It is important to note that three states have no express marital
exemption in their "silent" statutes.' 4 ' Therefore, the question of
whether the common law exemption is implicitly incorporated in
these statutes must be answered through future judicial decisions or
an expression of legislative intent. In addition, twelve states have ex-
119. One commentator suggests that "[a] new bride would be surprised indeed to find
that she had agreed to give up her right to bodily privacy and to submit to any force, brutal or
otherwise, her new spouse might use against her." Spousal Rape: The Uncommon Law, 66
A.B.A.J. 1088 (September 1980).
120. CAL. PENAL CODE § 262 (West 1980) (establishes a separate crime of spousal rape.
The marital exemption still applies when the victim is incapable of giving legal consent).
121. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53A-67(b) (1985) (exemption deleted from first degree forci-
ble rape but remains as an affirmative defense to lesser degrees of rape and sexual assault).
122. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 763, 764 (1984).
123. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 707-730, 707-731, 707-732 (1979).
124. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.349 (amended West 1986).
125. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:5 (1983).
126. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3128 (Purdon Supp. 1984).
127. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.44.010, 9A.44.040, 9A.44.050, 9A.44.060
(amended 1983) (exemption remains in third degree rape).
128. W. VA. CODE §§ 61-8B-3, 61-8B-6 (1984) (establishes the crime of "sexual assault
of a spouse" which carries a lesser penalty than rape by a stranger).
129. WYo. STAT. § 6-2-307 (1983) (exemption remains in third and fourth degree rape).
130. State v. Smith, 401 So.2d 1126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
131. People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 474 N.E.2d 567, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1984).
132. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794-011 (West 1984).
133. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3501, 3502 (1983).
134. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 22, ch. 277, § 39 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1979).
135. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-319, 28-320 (1979).
136. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-5(b) (West 1982).
137. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00 (McKinney 1978) (exemption declared unconstitutional
in People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 474 N.E.2d 567, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1984)).
138. OR. REV. STAT. § 163.305 (1985).
139. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252 (1985).
140. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(6) (West 1985).
141. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1801, 1803 (1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2001 (1985);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65(2) (1985); but see Warren v. State, 255 Ga. 151, 336 S.E.2d 221
(1985).
panded their marital exemptions to include cohabitators under cer-
tain circumstances.
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B. Pennsylvania's Spousal Sexual Assault Statute
1. Legislative History.-1983 and 1984 were busy years for the
Pennsylvania Legislature and the marital rape exemption. At that
time, the state could only prosecute a spouse for rape if the attack
occurred when the couple was living in separate residences or if a
written separation agreement or court imposed separation order was
executed.1' a After much lobbying by the Pennsylvania Coalitions
Against Domestic Violence and Rape, and public chastisement of
the law by a Philadelphia Common Pleas Court Judge,' 44 House Bill
400145 was introduced in the legislature on March 15, 1983. House
Bill 400 removed the spousal exemption from the existing rape and
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse statutes,'" replacing it with
an express abolition of the marital exemption. This bill was intended
to provide equal protection under the law to all rape victims in Penn-
sylvania. 47 House Bill 400 passed in the House and was referred to
the Judiciary Committee of the Senate where it received no further
attention.
On October 2, 1984, however, the Senate amended House Bill
1137148 to include the new crime of spousal sexual assault. 14' In es-
142. These states include: Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky,
Maine, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, Pennsylvania and West Virginia.
143. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3103 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
144. Judge Abraham Gafni was forced to acquit a defendant-husband under Pennsylva-
nia's marital rape exemption even after he found that the defendant had cruelly forced his two
month pregnant common law wife to engage in sexual intercourse after tying a stocking
around her neck and dragging her with it. Gressen, Husband Acquitted, Judge Criticizes
Rape Law, PA. L. J. REP., Vol. IV, No. 41, p. 5, col. 2 (Nov. 2, 1981).
145. H.B. 400 excluded the existing exemption in 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3103 (Pur-
don 1981) and replaced it with, "[s]pousal relationships, including persons living as husband
and wife, regardless of the legal status of their relationship, shall not bar any prosecution
under sections 3121 (relating to rape) and 3123 (relating to involuntary deviate sexual inter-
course)." H.B. 400, General Assembly of PA, Session of 1983, printers no. 450.
146. Pennsylvania's rape and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse laws are found at 18
PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §§ 3121, 3123 (Purdon Supp. 1984).
147. "The purpose of H.B. 400 is to eliminate the dual treatment of the same act in the
law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania." 90 PA. HousE LEG. J. 1798 (daily ed. November
15, 1983) (statement by Rep. Piccolla).
148. H.B. 1137 originally dealt with deception relating to certification of minority busi-
ness enterprise or women's business enterprise.
149. The amendment added the following to the definition Section 3103,
Spousal relationships, including persons living as husband and wife, regardless of
the legal status of their relationship, shall not bar any prosecution under section
3123 (relating to involuntary deviate sexual intercourse) and 3128 (relating to
spousal sexual assault).
and added the new Section 3128:
§ 3128. Spousal Sexual Assault
A person commits a felony of the first degree when he engages in sexual
intercourse with his spouse as further defined in Section 3103 (relating to spouse
sence, this amendment accomplished what House Bill 400 attempted
by retaining a first degree felony penalty and by using language sim-
ilar to that used to define the crime of rape. The new law merely
bore a new name. Once again, a plea for equal protection for Penn-
sylvania spouses was advanced.' 50 House Bill 1137, as amended,
passed in the Senate and won unanimous approval in the House of
Representatives.
On October 5, 1984, Governor Richard Thornburgh vetoed
House Bill 1137. The Governor expressed concern that the Common-
wealth "would be entering the privacy of the home and the sanctity
of an ongoing marriage" and that the bill "would lead to frivolous
and capricious charges, particularly at a time when the marriage
was dissolving" as well as "devalu[ing] the anguish suffered by real
victims of rape.'"' In his veto message, the Governor suggested that
the bill be amended to require that the crime be reported promptly
and that the victim show corroborating evidence of physical abuse.' 52
relationships):
(1) By forcible compulsion:
(2) By threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by
a person of reasonable resolution:
(3) Who is unconscious: or
(4) Who is so mentally deranged or deficient that such person is in-
capable of consent.
H.B. 1137, General Assembly of PA, Session of 1984, printers no. 3653.
150.
Equal protection under the law, a concept deeply imbedded in American
jurisprudence, a concept not always consistently followed however, but one chal-
lenged, and when there are inequities we seem to rise to the challenge and
change the law. This amendment is directed against an inequity.
Equal protection under the law is now requested to protect women and
wives from spousal rape or spousal sexual assault. The common law has long
provided an immunity from prosecution for rape by one spouse against the other
This morning we are here to correct this inequity, to say to all women of
this Commonwealth that you as a woman, as a wife, will be entitled to the same
protection as any other person against rape or sexual abuse. This amendment is
intended to correct this inequity by providing for the crime of spousal sexual
assault. The definition is the same as that of rape. By using the same definition,
we eliminate the problems of developing a new system of case law interpreting
an entirely new crime. The elements of proof are the same as those existing from
common law times and currently set forth in our criminal code: Sexual inter-
course imposed by force or threat of force involving threats of death or serious
bodily harm; penetration against the victim's will, however slight; and lack of
consent to sexual contact or intercourse. As with proof of the elements of rape,
all three must be proven under this new proposed addition to the Criminal Code.
59 PA. SEN. LEG. J., 2858 (October 2, 1984) (statement by Senator Shumaker).
151. Veto Message, 65 PA. HOUSE LEG. J., 2236 (November 20, 1984) [hereinafter cited
as Veto Message].
152. Veto Message, supra note 151, at 2236. Representatives of the Pennsylvania Coali-
tions against Domestic Violence and Rape responded to the Governor regarding his veto. Their
letter began by stating that marital rape victims are "real victims" who often suffer more
anguish than other victims because their violation is performed by someone whom they loved.
Pointing to a study of seventeen states without spousal immunity conducted by Pennsylvania
Senator Jeanette Reibman where none of the states reported inappropriate uses of their laws,
Although it previously gave its unanimous approval to House Bill
1137, the House of Representatives refused to override the Gover-
nor's veto despite a third plea to the General Assembly for equal
protection for spouses in the Commonwealth.
1 53
On November 20, 1984, the same day the House of Representa-
tives sustained the Governor's veto of House Bill 1137, the Senate
again amended a house bill to include the crime of spousal sexual
assault. 154 The House of Representatives concurred in the Senate
amendment to House Bill 281, and the Governor signed the bill into
law December 21, 1984. The long struggle for the abolition of
spousal immunity in the crime of marital rape in Pennsylvania ended
in a substantial compromise of the rights of married persons
throughout the Commonwealth.155
the writers stated that frivolous charges are extremely unlikely since other less traumatic
charges can be filed. Regarding the reporting requirement, the authors questioned its wisdom
in light of the General Assembly's 1976 repeal of a reporting period in the rape law. In addi-
tion, California has found its reporting period in need of reevaluation. Finally, the writers
noted that a physical evidence requirement would ignore cases where the victim is threatened
with bodily injury to herself or a loved one while dismissing the frequently repeated advice
that a woman in a life threatening sexual attack should not fight back. (Letter to Governor
Thornburgh, Oct. 25, 1984) (on file at the DICKINSON LAW REVIEW Office). [Hereinafter
cited as Lobbyist Veto Response].
153.
All we are doing, in essence, is asking for equal protection under the law. All we
are doing is asking that the defense of marriage be removed from the books, and
that will offer all women equal opportunity and equal protection under the law
so that they can come before our courts, plead their case, and a judge and a jury
will decide on the basis of that case. If that judge or that jury feels that they
have not come with evidence within the time period which they feel is important
to render a good decision, they will decide based upon the evidence that is before
them.
65 PA. HOUSE LEG. J., 2239 (daily ed. November 20, 1984) (statement by Rep. Linton).
154. Title 18 was amended by adding a section to read:
§ 3128. Spousal Sexual Assault.
(A) Sexual Assault.-A person commits a felony of the second degree when
that person engages in sexual intercourse with that person's spouse:
(1) by forcible compulsion;
(2) by threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by
a person of reasonable resolution; or
(3) who is unconscious.
(B) Involuntary spousal deviate sexual intercourse.-A person commits a
felony of the second degree when that person engages in deviate sexual inter-
course with that person's spouse:
(1) by forcible compulsion;
(2) by threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by
a person of reasonable resolution; or
(3) who is unconscious.
(C) Crime to be reported.-The crime of spousal sexual assault shall be
personally reported by the victim or her agent to a law enforcement agency hav-
ing the requisite jurisdiction within 90 days of the commission of the offense.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3128 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
155.
I'm going to vote for this bill reluctantly, because I am not pleased with this bill
at all. It creates a double standard. A rape is a rape regardless whether it occurs
in the street or in the home. But this seems to be the best bill we can get at this
time, so I am going to go along with it.
2. Current Protection Afforded to Pennsylvania's Marital
Rape Victims.-The significance of the current spousal sexual as-
sault law is that Pennsylvania considers marital rape almost as seri-
ous as rape outside of the marriage. This distinction becomes appar-
ent through an examination of a marital rape victim's remedies in
Pennsylvania.
If a spouse lives in a separate residence or obtains a written
separation agreement or court imposed separation order prior to the
time of the attack, she may charge her spouse with rape156 utilizing
Pennsylvania's exception to the marital rape exemption. 157 This
spouse is bound by the five year statute of limitations158 for reporting
the rape which is punishable as a first degree felony by imprison-
ment for up to twenty years. In addition, if this spouse is so mentally
deranged or deficient that she is legally incapable of consenting to
sexual intercourse, the law protects the spouse-victim even if the
rape lacked an element of force or threat of force. The law treats a
separated spouse-victim exactly the same way as an unmarried rape
victim.
In contrast, the new spousal sexual assault law treats a victim of
marital rape as a second class victim if she resides with her spouse at
the time of the attack without a written separation agreement or a
court order. Under section 3128,159 this spouse is not considered a
rape victim but rather a victim of a form of assault. Unlike the first
degree felony penalty available for the crime of rape, this victim's
attacker is punishable with up to ten years imprisonment under a
second degree felony. This penalty equates a husband's violation of
his wife's bodily integrity with the crimes of criminal trespass and
forging a check.160
In addition, this spouse must report her attack within ninety
days to receive protection under the new law. It appears illogical to
allow spousal victims who are already financially or emotionally in-
dependent from their spouses five years to report their attack while
other cohabitating spouses must report their attacks within ninety
days. Cohabitating spouses must make major decisions about their
lives such as whether to end their marriages, how to leave, where to
live, and perhaps how to support themselves and their children. Fi-
nally, the new law excludes the provision contained in the general
rape law that protects mentally deranged or deficient victims. A
69 PA. HousE LEG. J., 2418 (daily ed. November 28, 1984) (statement by Rep. Harper).
156. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (amended Purdon Supp. 1984).
157. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3103 (amended Purdon Supp. 1984).
158. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5552 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
159. See supra text at note 154.
160. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3503, 4101 (1983).
spouse who suffers physical and verbal abuse over a period of years
could fall within this category and deserves protection under the law.
The spousal sexual assault law is often justified as providing a
remedy where none previously existed."'1 But the law actually per-
petuates the inadequate protection afforded to Pennsylvania spouses
by requiring them to read their spouses' minds, anticipate an attack
and take some action prior to its occurrence to receive protection
equal to other rape victims of this state. The fact that this foresight
is often impossible designates a class of spouses as second class vic-
tims not worthy of equal protection.
V. Widespread Dissatisfaction with the Pennsylvania Law
Both opponents and supporters of the abolition of spousal im-
munity for the crime of rape criticize Pennsylvania's spousal sexual
assault law. The concerns expressed are similar to those frequently
articulated regarding the imposition of a sanction for marital rape.
A. Opponents' Contentions
1. Fear of False Claims.-The most common argument advanced
in opposition to a marital rape law is that scheming wives will fabri-
cate complaints to punish their husbands or to blackmail them into
favorable property settlements upon divorce. 162 Some courts, legisla-
tors, and commentators find this argument unpersuasive. A New
Jersey trial court noted that "the law already furnishes an arsenal of
such weapons to a woman bent on revenge." 1ro In addition, the abuse
161.
I see the vote tonight as imposing penalties for spousal rape whereas at the time
we are taking a vote there are no penalties . . . .Frankly, I have always felt if
you cannot get the whole loaf of bread, at least take half of it. Do not starve to
death.
62 PA. SENATE LEG. J., 1950 (daily ed. November 20, 1984) (statement by Senator
Zemprelli).
162. Veto Message, supra note 151. at 2236;
This argument has its roots not in marital rape, but in forcible rape. For
generations it was used to support the extraordinary roadblocks that most juris-
dictions erected to preclude rape convictions (i.e. requirements of corroboration,
proof of resistance, proof of lack of consent, testimony on previous sexual history
of the victim). Most of the traditional problems with rape laws identified by
feminists and scholars have stemmed from the historical male belief that the
female gender is rife with spiteful shrews who often falsely accuse innocent men
of sexual attacks. The dramatic changes in rape laws in the United States during
the 1970's was achieved by pointing out that there is no basis in fact for the
belief that women make false reports of rape more than other alleged crime
victims make false reports.
Schwartz, supra note 22, at 52.
163. "Charges of assault and battery, larceny, fraud and other offenses may just as
readily be the subject of such false accusations between spouses." State v. Smith, 148 N.J.
Super. 219, 225-26, 372 A.2d 386, 389 (Law Div. 1977), aff'd per curiam, 169 N.J. Super. 98,
404 A.2d 331 (App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d 38 (1981).
argument fails to recognize that rape prosecutions are often more
humiliating for the victim than the defendant. One commentator
suggests that "the stigma associated with such a sordid incident, the
reluctance to face the insinuations of defense attorneys, and the fear
of retaliation by the accused are powerful deterrents which have re-
sulted in rape being one of the most underreported crimes.""', Fi-
nally, the criminal justice system is competent to test the truth or
falsity of marital rape accusations.'"5 The fear of fabricated claims,
often based on instinct rather than empirical data, should not deny
the availability of equal protection under the law for Pennsylvania
spouses, particularly since information collected in Pennsylvania and
other states does not substantiate this fear.'"
2. Adequacy of Alternate Remedies.--Opposition to the
spousal sexual assault law is also rationalized on the ground that
assault and battery laws provide adequate protection for victims of
forcible rape in marriage. This argument fails to recognize the real
violation involved in a rape. The fact that rape laws exist at all im-
plies that they protect a harm qualitatively different from the injury
protected by assault and battery laws. 1 7 In addition to bodily safety,
rape laws protect a woman's right to bodily integrity which includes
164. Comment, supra note 22, at 315.
165. State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. 219, 226, 372 A.2d 386, 389 (L. Div. 1977), a ffd
per curiam, 169 N.J. Super. 98, 404 A.2d 331 (App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d
38 (1981);
The fact is that there are so many built-in protections, built-in restraints
against the abuse that it does not occur, and if it does occur, it is with substan-
tial infrequency. Those defenses are the fact that when someone says they want
to bring that action, there is an attorney there who is going to be a restraint on
them; there is a district attorney who is going to be a restraint; there is an action
before a district justice that is going to be a restraint; there is the public notori-
ety that is going to be a restraint. There are the same built-in restraints for rape
as there are for aggravated assault, and I submit that the argument is frivolous
itself.
65 PA. HOUSE LEG. J., 2239 (daily ed. November 20, 1984) (statement by Rep. Broujos).
166. Lobbyist Veto Response, supra note 152. In addition, an Oregon District Attorney
stated that since Oregon's exemption was abolished,
[t]he one thing that has not happened, and which I stressed in my testimony to
[the California] Senate Judiciary Committee, is that embittered and vengeful
wives are not rushing to their District Attorney to falsely claim rape in order to
gain leverage on their husbands in a divorce. Victims are very reluctant to report
the crime.
Letter from Peter F. Sandrock, Jr., District Attorney, Benton County, Oregon, to the
Women's History Research Center, Berkeley, CA (July 7, 1980). The author of this comment
sent a survey to sixty-five district attorneys of all counties throughout Pennsylvania. Of the
forty-one responses received, only nine incidents of spousal sexual assault were reported to
district attorneys' offices since the new law became effective February 19, 1985. Charges were
filed in five cases, two of which are still pending. This study suggests two things: first, spouses
are not flooding the courtrooms with fabricated complaints, and second, the district attorneys'
discretion eliminated potentially invalid claims. This demonstrates that our criminal justice
system's built-in protections are competent to handle any possible abuse.
167. Comment, supra note 22, at 316.
her right to control procreation. 1 8 The fact that a rape occurs within
a marriage does not affect the interests violated.169 Theoretically, ac-
cording to this rationale, the crime of rape should be eliminated en-
tirely for all victims since other remedies are available to deal with
the problem. The illogical nature of this argument becomes apparent
when viewed from this perspective.
3. Interference with Marital Relations and Obstacle to Recon-
ciliation.-The least tenable of all arguments against laws prohibit-
ing marital rape insists that these laws interfere with the sanctity of
marriage, thereby preventing possible reconciliation of the parties.17 0
This rationale assumes that a household in which a marital rape oc-
curs has room left for further disruption. The Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia readily dismissed this argument by pointing out that it is the




The most frequent criticism of Pennsylvania's spousal sexual as-
sault law by those who support the abolition of the marital rape ex-
emption is that it perpetuates unequal treatment of rape victims
based on their marital status. An illuminating example of this ineq-
uity might follow this scenario: Spouse A becomes frustrated with
her marriage and moves into her own apartment. Her husband rapes
her the first night she is living on her own. Spouse B is married and
living with her husband. One night he has too much to drink and
violently beats and rapes his wife. Under current Pennsylvania law,
Spouse A is treated as a non-married victim who may charge her
husband with the first degree felony of rape.172 Spouse B, however,
may only charge her husband with the second degree felony of
spousal sexual assault. In addition, if both of these rapes occurred
after the husbands drugged1 7 8 their wives so that they became tem-
porarily mentally deficient and the husbands did not use or threaten
168. People v. DeStefano, 121 Misc. 2d 113, 123, 467 N.Y.S.2d 506, 513-14 (Suffolk
Cty. Ct. 1983).
169. Comment, supra note 22, at 316.
170. Veto Message, supra note 151, at 2236.
171.
This argument is absurd. It is hard to imagine how charging a husband with the
violent crime of rape could be more disruptive of a marriage than the violent act
itself. Moreover, if the marriage has already deteriorated to the point where
intercourse must be commanded at the price of violence we doubt that there is
anything left to reconcile.
Weishaupt v. Virginia, 228 Va. 389, 315 S.E.2d 847 (1984).
172. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3103 (amended Purdon Supp. 1984).
173. "The victims we see . . . have had sexual acts forced upon them by a spouse, in
some cases while they were drugged .... " Lobbyist Veto Response, supra note 152.
to use force during their violations, Spouse A would have a legal
remedy while Spouse B would go unprotected under the law. 174
Spouse B would also be unprotected in any circumstance if she
waited longer than ninety days to report the attack.
Generally, equal protection clauses175 require that similarly situ-
ated persons receive evenhanded treatment under the law. 77 The
equal protection clause of the United States Constitution guarantees
that states cannot classify persons to burden arbitrarily a particular
group of individuals, to unfairly affect fundamental rights, or to base
classifications on impermissible criteria. 7 7 Judicial review of a legis-
lative classification utilizes three steps. First, the court determines
the nature of the individual's interest. The court then examines the
state's interest in selecting the particular classification. The statute's
tailoring is finally examined to determine if the statute is too broad
for its purposes. These steps determine whether the classification
bears a sufficient relationship to a legitimate state interest. s7 8 Courts
utilize three levels of scrutiny for reviewing the sufficiency of the
relationship between the classification and the legitimate state inter-
est: the rational relationship test, the middle tier or intermediate
test, and the strict scrutiny test.'7
An equal protection analysis of Pennsylvania's spousal sexual
assault law may take two approaches. 180 Utilizing the rationale of
the New York trial court in People v. DeStefano,' a court may find
that the law unfairly affects spousal rape victims' fundamental
rights ' 2 to individual autonomy and to control procreation, which
174. It is arguable that the spousal sexual assault law itself discourages reconciliatory
actions between spouses because a woman is afforded greater protection when she leaves the
residence of her spouse or executes written separation documents.
175. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; PA. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 9, 26; "Sections I and 26, along
with Section 9, [of Article 11 provides for 'due process' and 'equal protection' generally, al-
though not in language as specific as the Fourteenth Amendment." ROBERT E. WOODSIDE,
PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 21 (1985).
176. People v. DeStefano, 121 Misc. 2d 113, 115, 467 N.Y.S.2d 506, 509 (Suffolk Cty.
Ct. 1983).
177. Clancy, Equal Protection Considerations of the Spousal Sexual Assault Exclu-
sion, 16 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1, 8 (1980).
178. Clancy, supra note 177, at 8-9.
179. People v. DeStefano, 121 Misc. 2d 113, 115, 116, 126, 467 N.Y.S.2d 506, 509
(Suffolk Cty. Ct. 1983); Clancy, supra note 177, at 9-10.
180. A nonspousal actor or spousal actor that is treated as unmarried under the rape law
would have standing to allege that the statutory classification of the spousal sexual assault law
unconstitutionally burdens him by imposing greater liability on him for acts that are either
prosecuted with a lesser penalty or not prosecuted at all (e.g., sex with a mentally deranged or
deficient cohabitating spouse). A spousal victim provided with a lesser penalty crime or no
protection under the law may have difficulty establishing standing because due process require-
ments might prevent a prosecution for forced sexual acts where the defendant does not have
notice that his conduct is criminal, or the extent of the criminal liability under the dual pen-
alty scheme. E.g., Clancy, supra note 177, at 4-8.
181. 121 Misc. 2d 113, 467 N.Y.S.2d 506 (Suffolk Cty. Ct. 1983).
182. One commentator suggests that this line of reasoning could still be applied even if
are part of the comprehensive right of bodily integrity. 8 The state
violates these rights by providing less protection 84 to cohabiting
spouse victims than to other rape victims and by providing no protec-
tion to mentally deranged or deficient cohabiting spouse victims of
nonforceful rapes. Since impingement of a fundamental right trig-
gers the strict scrutiny test, the state will have to establish that the
law advances a compelling state interest.1
8 5
Under a different approach, utilized by the Court of Appeals of
New York in People v. Liberta,'s6 the court may examine the statute
to determine if it burdens a particular group of individuals. 87 The
Pennsylvania spousal sexual assault law draws a distinction based on
marital status. When a statute draws such a distinction, the classifi-
cation must be reasonable and must be based upon "some ground of
difference that rationally explains the different treatment."'88
In light of the recent judicial innovation in recognizing the
archaic and untenable nature of the rationales underlying differenti-
ated treatment for victims of rape based on marital status, 89 a
Pennsylvania court may be entirely justified in reaching a conclusion
that "[n]o rule or statute granting a spouse immunity can in today's
world withstand any of the tests associated with equal protection, to
wit, reasonable basis, middle tier or strict scrutiny.""90
the spousal victim was found to lack standing.
Although the general rule is that a claimant may only assert his own constitu-
tional rights, there are numerous exceptions to the rule. One exception is where
fundamental rights are impinged in situations where it is difficult or impossible
for the persons whose rights are affected to present their grievance before any
court. Thus, if it were determined that spousal victims had fundamental rights
impinged by the statutory scheme and that those victims could not present their
claims before any court, then the nonspousal defendant might be allowed to
"use" the spousal victims' rights to obtain strict scrutiny of his equal protection
defense.
Clancy, supra note 177, at 12.
183. People v. DeStefano, 121 Misc. 2d 113, 123, 467 N.Y.S.2d 506, 513-14 (Suffolk
Cty. Ct. 1983).
184. "Less protection" is provided in the form o." a lesser penalty and, in some cases, no
penalty or criminal liability at all.
185. Clancy, supra note 177, at 9.
186. 64 N.Y.S.2d 152, 474 N.E.2d 567, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1984).
187. Id. at 163, 474 N.E.2d at 573, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 212-13.
188. Id. at 163, 474 N.E.2d at 573, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 213.
189. State v. Rider, 449 So.2d 903 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), appeal dismissed, 105 S.
Ct. 1830 (1985); State v. Smith, 401 So.2d 1126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Warren v. State,
255 Ga. 151, 336 S.E.2d 221 (1985); Commonwealth v. Chretien, 383 Mass. 123, 417 N.E.2d
1203 (1981); State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. 219, 372 A.2d 386 (Law Div. 1977), affd per
curiam, 169 N.J. Super. 98, 404 A.2d 331 (App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d 38
(1981); State v. Morrison, 85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d 47 (1981); People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d
152, 474 N.E.2d 567, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1984); People v. DeStefano, 121 Misc. 2d 113, 467
N.Y.S.2d 506 (Suffolk Cty. Ct. 1983); Kizer v. Virginia, 228 Va. 256, 321 S.E.2d 291 (1984);
Weishaupt v. Virginia, 227 Va. 389, 315 S.E.2d 847 (1984).
190. People v. DeStefano, 121 Misc. 2d 113, 127, 467 N.Y.S.2d 506, 516 (Suffolk Cty.
Ct. 1983).
VI. Conclusion
Marital rape is a serious problem that has been misunderstood
and mistreated for too long. Courts throughout the United States
recognize that the traditional rationales underlying spousal immu-
nity are no longer valid in modern society. Although they are more
reluctant than judges to abandon spousal immunity, legislators
throughout this country are also responding to the call for rape law
reform by abolishing the marital rape exemption.
The Pennsylvania General Assembly attempted to take a step
toward spousal rape protection by creating the crime of spousal sex-
ual assault. Unfortunately, the new law merely perpetuates the une-
qual protection historically provided to sexually abused spouses. For
true equal protection to prevail, the Pennsylvania Legislature must
reconsider its previous action and abolish spousal immunity in every
form. The General Assembly should either repeal the spousal sexual
assault law and apply Pennsylvania's rape and involuntary deviate
sexual intercourse laws to all persons, regardless of their marital sta-
tus, or revise the elements and penalty of the spousal sexual assault
law so that they are identical to the rape and involuntary deviate
sexual intercourse laws. If the legislature is unwilling to perform this
task, the courts will soon face the decision in a constitutional chal-
lenge to Pennsylvania's law. 91
Abigail Andrews Tierney
191. A Luzerne County man charged on July 31, 1985, with spousal sexual assault,
involuntary spousal deviate sexual intercourse, aggravated assault, simple assault, and making
terroristic threats has moved to dismiss these charges challenging the new spousal sexual as-
sault law as violative of his constitutional rights to privacy and equal protection under the law.
The defendant allegedly held a kitchen knife to his wife's throat, forced her to have sex with
him, beat her and threatened to kill or otherwise harm the couple's one-year-old son. (Luzerne
County, Pennsylvania, Docket #1511-1985).

